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Abstract
Welfare state reform in times of austerity is notoriously difficult because most
citizens oppose retrenchment of social benefits. Governments thus tend to combine
cutbacks with selective benefit expansions, thereby creating trade-offs: in order to
secure new advantages, citizens need to accept painful cutbacks. Prior research
has been unable to assess the effectiveness of compensating components in restric-
tive welfare reforms. We provide novel evidence on feasible reform strategies by
applying conjoint survey analysis to a highly realistic direct democratic setting of
multidimensional welfare state reform. Drawing on an original survey of Swiss
citizens’ attitudes on an encompassing pension reform, we empirically demonstrate
that built-in trade-offs strongly enhance the prospects of restrictive welfare reforms.
Our findings indicate that agency matters: governments and policy-makers can and
must grant the right compensations to the relevant opposition groups in order to
overcome institutional inertia.
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1 Introduction
The modern welfare state is one of the major social and political achievements of the
20th century post-war era in the developed OECD world. It has supported democratic
stability and has allowed shielding most citizens throughout Europe from the main risks
of income loss and poverty, such as sickness, old age or unemployment. At the beginning
of the 21st century, however, European welfare states have come under heavy political
pressure, because demographic and economic structural change call for financial con-
solidation or even retrenchment of welfare benefits (Pierson, 2001; Huber & Stephens,
2001). At the same time, new social risks and economic grievances have increased social
demands towards the welfare state (Pierson, 2001; Bonoli, 2005). Beyond the need for
financial stabilization, the sustainability of welfare states also depends on their capacity
of adaptation. For these reasons, understanding the reform capacity of welfare states has
become a key topic in comparative politics (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Pierson, 2001; Hu-
ber & Stephens, 2001; Hacker, 2004; Kuhnle, 2002; Immergut, Anderson & Schulze, 2007;
Brooks & Manza, 2008; Palier, 2010; Häusermann, 2010; Rehm, Hacker & Schlesinger,
2012; Hemerijck, 2013; Gingrich, 2014; Huber & Stephens, 2015; Lindvall, 2017). All these
studies show that – despite strong functional pressure for welfare reform – the financial
consolidation of major welfare programs and their adaptation to new social demands
are highly conflictual politically, as institutional feedback processes create endogenous
stabilizers for existing welfare state programs (Pierson, 2000).
It is striking that all the institutional stabilization mechanisms of welfare states are
based on citizens’ preferences and public opinion: reforms are difficult either because
citizens protest against cutbacks (in the electoral or non-electoral arena), or because
elites fear the repercussions of reforms and use different blame-avoidance strategies (Vis,
2016).1 Therefore, the key question for welfare state research in the 21st century has
become under what conditions existing social benefits can be cut back, either to stabilize
1A recent literature (Giger & Nelson, 2011) shows that not all retrenchment is equally unpopular.
Where risks are concentrated (e.g. unemployment, see Rehm et al. (2012)), public opinion may support,
rather than oppose cost containment. However, public opinion is clearly opposed to cutbacks when it
comes to “life-cycle risks” (Jensen, 2012) such as health, old age and education.
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existing welfare regimes financially, or to adapt welfare states to new social demands.
The main answer to this question in the welfare state literature is that significant
welfare reform is possible when governments manage to diffuse resistance by compensating
(potential) opponents. A great number of empirical studies have established such political
exchange as a key mechanism of current welfare reform politics (Levy, 1999; Bonoli, 2000;
Pierson, 2001; Natali & Rhodes, 2004; Häusermann, 2010; Huber & Stephens, 2015; Knotz
& Lindvall, 2015; Lindvall, 2017). Their findings imply that unpopular reforms need to
be counterbalanced to be viable politically. If a reform contains both contested as well
as popular elements, individuals and collective actors are confronted with a trade-off:
while they reject the reform based on the cutbacks, they may be interested in the reform
being adopted based on the compensating aspects. Eventually, citizens may support
the overall package despite their opposition to certain parts of the reform. The aggregate
support for the reform will depend on the relative importance individuals or social groups
attribute to the different elements of the reform. This argument has prominently brought
agency back into a literature that had become predominantly focused on mechanisms of
institutional path-dependency and stability: if it is true that governments can skillfully
“design” reforms in a way that secures sufficient popular support, then the room for
politics and choice is re-established.
However, despite the theoretical prominence of the compensation argument, prior re-
search has to date been unable to assess the impact of compensating, expansive reform
elements on attitudes towards restrictive welfare reforms, because such reforms are mul-
tidimensional. In other words, we do not have empirical knowledge on the effectiveness
of different kinds of compensation strategies. Who needs to be compensated and which
groups are (most) receptive to compensations? The reason for this lack of research on
the micro-foundations of welfare reform is that standard survey data does not provide
information on preferences regarding multidimensional policy reforms. As a consequence,
all we can do is to infer the effectiveness of compensations ex post and indirectly (e.g.
via electoral outcomes (Giger & Nelson, 2013)), after unpopular reform elements were
implemented. However, this kind of backward induction implies that we can never test
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the mechanism of compensation itself, and neither can we empirically identify the relative
effectiveness of different compensation strategies.
In this paper, we introduce experimental conjoint survey analysis to study the politi-
cal dynamics of compensation in welfare reform. Conjoint analysis prompts respondents
to choose between different policy packages, rather than simply asking about support
for different specific measures. The packages contain diverse reform elements, both ele-
ments of retrenchment and compensation, and therefore allow us to study the respective
contribution of each individual reform element on overall support in the context of multi-
dimensional welfare reform.
Our empirical case is the most recent pension reform in Switzerland, a reform pro-
cess that entails different compensation strategies in the one social policy field – old age
pensions – where benefit retrenchment and financial consolidation are the least popular
(Jensen, 2012). Switzerland provides an ideal context for studying social policy prefer-
ences, because citizens have the possibility to ask for a vote on major welfare reforms in
direct democratic referenda. Hence, we are able to study preferences for welfare retrench-
ment and compensation in a highly realistic setting.
We find that, while pension retrenchment quite dramatically reduces support for a
reform, compensation via recalibrating and targeting elements can counterbalance the
cost of cutbacks. Generally, retrenching reform packages that include compensation gen-
erate higher support than reform proposals including very weak or no compensation.
Moreover, with regard to specific social groups, our results show that targeted pension
improvements and recalibrating reform elements effectively increase support among low
income earners and women, their main beneficiaries. However, the findings also point
to a stronger effect of ideology (partisanship) on preferences for specific compensation
strategies, compared to socio-economic determinants. Overall, we conclude that compen-
sating elements, especially recalibration, effectively enhance the prospects of restrictive
welfare reforms.
Our findings are relevant beyond the Swiss context, because even in countries where
reforms are not voted at the polls, governments and political parties are sensitive to pub-
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lic opinion, and citizens can protest and even veto unpopular and unbalanced reforms via
protest, strikes and other forms of direct contestation. These forms of political participa-
tion can be seen as functional equivalents to the Swiss referenda. Moreover, we contend
that our findings are not contingent on particularly high levels of information, because we
included in our survey only reform issues that were highly politicized and visible in the
public debate, and additional tests show that both high- and low-educated respondents
answer the conjoint experiment consistently.
2 Theory: the politics of trade-offs in welfare state
reform
Compensation and political exchange play a key role in today’s welfare reform capacity.
This argument is largely uncontested in the welfare state literature (cf. Bonoli & Natali,
2012; Huber & Stephens, 2015; Knotz & Lindvall, 2015; Lindvall, 2017). Of course, there
are specific institutional and political circumstances, in which even harsh cutbacks can
be imposed by governments2, but when it comes to the established central pillars of the
welfare state, on which the financial stability of the entire regime ultimately depends –
and old age pensions are the prime example of those – such unilateral, uncompensated
cutbacks have turned out to be politically unviable (Pierson, 2001; Häusermann, 2010;
Vail, 2010; Jensen, 2012). The main reason why uncompensated pension cutbacks are
unviable is that existing benefits enjoy very strong support among a broad majority of
the citizens, and thus the defenders of existing benefit levels and benefit structures have
political visibility and clout, both in the public debates and in organized politics. In
a recent study, Busemeyer and Garritzmann (2017) confirm that when confronted with
trade-offs between several desirable goals, people were particularly unwilling to accept
cutbacks in pension benefits. In other words, compensating the opponents of a reform is
crucial for a government that wants to cut back pension benefits.
2E.g. when power is undivided and governments do not fear the electoral backlash (Kitschelt, 2001)
or when retrenchment affects a small group who bears concentrated risks (Jensen, 2012) or social groups
that are considered “undeserving” (Van Oorschot, 2006)
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To motivate the set-up of our argument and analysis, Figure 1 illustrates the widespread
unpopularity of pension cutbacks and the opposition among particular groups by showing
the share of respondents in our survey who claim that lower benefits are “not accept-
able”.3 The high values across the entire sample and among all groups show how strongly
unpopular pension benefit retrenchment is, even among upper income classes and across
the political spectrum. However, some groups stand out in their opposition. On the one
hand, more vulnerable socio-structural categories – lower-income earners and women4 –
are particularly opposed to lower benefits. On the other hand, party affiliation matters:
Voters of the Far Right and the Left are the main opponents to cutbacks. The opposi-
tion among left voters is generally a more serious threat to cost-saving reforms because
the Far Right in Switzerland promotes lower taxes and market-liberalism (Bornschier,
2015) and is therefore very unlikely to challenge pension retrenchment – despite the more
skeptical stance of their voters. The Left, in contrast, has a history of challenging any
retrenchment in direct democratic referenda.5
Figure 1 highlights both the unpopularity of retrenchment and the need for compensa-
tion. Existing research has conceptualized and observed different kinds of compensation,
which can be grouped into three strategies, based on the specific social and/or polit-
ical groups that are compensated. First, opponents can be compensated via targeting,
i.e. retrenchment is combined with benefit expansions for lower-income beneficiaries. The
negative effects of cutbacks are thereby mitigated for the most vulnerable, usually through
the strengthening of means-tested aspects of the social policy schemes (for examples with
regard to pension and labor market reforms in Continental and Southern Europe, see,
3Respondents were asked how they would prefer to consolidate pension finances: a) by balancing
retrenchment and increased revenues, b) primarily through cutbacks, since higher taxes are not acceptable
c) primarily through higher revenues, since lower benefits are not acceptable. The graphs show shares
of answers to c).
4Switzerland has a typical continental (Palier, 2010) pension system based on earnings-related social
insurance. This overall architecture benefits to continuous employment biographies and middle/upper
income classes, which is why old age poverty risks are significantly higher for lower income classes, was
well as women.
5Two referenda against pension cutbacks in 2003 and 2010 were launched by the Left and successfully
blocked reforms. In the fall of 2017, the radical wing of the Swiss Left also fought against the current
reform in the referendum campaign – because it was fiscally saving – thereby joining in an “unholy
alliance” with right-wing liberal actors who thought that compensation had gone too far. Together, this
alliance against the reform defied the proposal in the referendum with 53 percent of the votes.
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e.g., Rhodes, 2001; Knotz & Lindvall, 2015). Targeting is supposed to foster support for
the reform among the direct beneficiaries of targeted expansions (i.e. the lower-income
voters), as well as among left-wing voters who are opposed to greater inequality.
The second compensation strategy is recalibration. Recalibration links benefit cut-
backs to welfare state “updating” (Pierson, 2001), i.e. the adaptation of social policies to
changed family patterns and employment biographies. Improving social benefits for part-
time workers, de-coupling rights from marriage status or granting social benefits for child
care duties are typical examples of recalibrating compensation (for examples in the area
of pension policy all across European countries, see, e.g., Bonoli, 2000; Immergut et al.,
2007; Häusermann, 2010; Palier, 2010). Recalibration benefits mostly women, as well as
more generally people with discontinuous employment biographies. It is supposed to find
support among those groups and among advocates of universalistic, gender egalitarian
social policies more generally.
Finally, the third strategy of compensation refers to combining benefit cutbacks with
increased revenues for social security, in order to bolster the financial stability of social
7
security in the longer run and to share the burden between both sides of expenditures and
revenues (for examples of contribution increases as a reform strategy in many countries
of Continental Europe, see Palier, 2010). Balancing financial consolidation between taxes
and expenditures has been a long-standing claim of the Left in many countries, which is
why this compensation strategy should bolster support for the reform particularly among
left-wing voters.
In this paper, we test the effect of including such compensations on overall support
for a reform package that contains unpopular retrenchment. Before developing more
specific expectations, we state a first, general hypothesis (H1) that compensation does
increase popular support for welfare reform. More specifically (in terms of an observable
implication), we expect to find reform packages, which contain elements that are strongly
contested on their own, to nevertheless receive majority support when compensating
measures are included.
The more specific question, of course, is which compensation strategy is effective among
which voters? Given that targeting, recalibration and increasing tax revenues are directed
towards lower-income voters, women and left-wing voters respectively, we will study the
impact of income, gender and partisanship on reform support. We expect people with
lower incomes to be particularly responsive to targeting (H2) and women to be particu-
larly responsive to recalibration (H3). In other words, we expect targeting to contribute
to the support for a reform package among lower income people, and we expect recalibra-
tion to increase the support for a reform among women. In addition, we expect voters of
left parties to be particularly responsive to recalibration, targeting, as well as increased
revenues (H4), since all of these compensation strategies address key concerns of left-wing
political programs, i.e. the correction of inequalities, societal modernization and equal
burden-sharing.
8
3 Case Selection, Experimental Design, Data and
Estimation Methods
3.1 Pension retrenchment in a direct democratic context
We test the effects of different compensation strategies in the field of pension policy
reform in Switzerland. This case provides us with an ideal real-world setting to study
welfare reform attitudes.
Pension reform is the prime example of a welfare policy in which reform is constrained
by public opinion, because mature pension regimes in the developed OECD countries fea-
ture precisely the endogenous institutional feedback effects that account for widespread
opposition against retrenchment. Hence, pension policy is most likely the area in which
political exchange and compensation are key conditions for reform success (Immergut
et al., 2007). Pension policy is also an ideal policy area to compare the various com-
pensation strategies, because old age income protection relies on a range of different
distributive principles (Pierson, 2001; Palier, 2010): Basic pension schemes provide op-
portunities for targeting reforms. Earnings-related occupational pensions generally lead
to pension differentials between men and women. Moreover, this gender bias has entailed
new social risks for women, which provide a need for recalibration. Finally, most coun-
tries finance public pensions through contributions, which implies that governments can
indeed re-balance pension finances both via reduced benefits or via increased revenues.
Switzerland provides an ideal empirical setting for studying policy reform attitudes,
because it provides survey respondents with a realistic task. Being a semi-direct democ-
racy, major pension reforms in Switzerland are usually subject to a direct democratic
referendum.6 Therefore, most respondents have evaluated policy trade-offs and compen-
sations in the past. Indeed, over the past 25 years, Swiss voters have been called to
the polls no less than 7 times to cast a vote on pension reform (Häusermann, 2010).
These context conditions improve the external validity of our experimental findings, as
6Referenda on reforms of laws are optional in Switzerland. If opponents of the reform manage to
collect 50’000 signatures in 100 days, the reform will be voted on. Despite not being mandatory, major
social policy reforms are almost always subject to a referendum.
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the survey puts respondents in a real-world situation.
In order to further improve the validity of our findings, we study reform attitudes with
regard to an actual policy reform process, rather than asking respondents about abstract
or hypothetical preferences, as it is usually done in similar surveys. Measuring preferences
without putting them in a relevant, real-life context can create distortion for various
framing or confounding effects (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001). The most recent Swiss
pension reform (“Altersvorsorge 2020”) provides the perfect example of a policy reform
aimed primarily at financial consolidation, but supposed to foster popular support by
compensation.7 The government’s explicit aim in this reform was to secure the financial
stability of the pension regime at least until 2030. To this effect, the government proposed
in 2014 to raise women’s retirement age and to lower general pensions, as well as widows’
pensions. Combined, these two measures would reduce expenditures massively by almost
6 percent (estimated savings by 2030 compared to the current annual expenditure of
the system, see Appendix B in the supplementary information). In order to mitigate the
effects of such retrenchment and to foster popular support for the reform, the government
also proposed several expansive elements to be included in the same reform. Table 1
provides an overview of the most important, visible and politicized reform elements in the
government proposal and theorizes them in the terms developed above. It is important
to notice, however, that despite the compensating elements, the overall effect of the
reform would still remain fiscally saving. Even if the proposed retrenchment was to be
compensated most generously, the proposed reform would still curb expenditures by at
least 2.5 percent.
7The Swiss pension system provides opportunities for all three strategies of compensation: the first
pillar (AHV) provides universal, redistributive basic public pensions. By contrast, the second pillar
provides occupational pensions on a strictly actuarial basis (social insurance). Hence, while the first
pillar provides ample opportunities for targeting compensations, the Achilles heel of the second pillar
typically is a bias against female employment biographies, which brings demand for recalibration on the
agenda. Since part of the first pillar is financed via VAT, this provides leeway for increasing revenues.
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Table 1: The Swiss pension reform “Altersvorsorge2020”
Reform Content Goal of the
elements reform
elements
Pension The conversion rate denotes the rate at which the capitalized old age Retrenchment
cutbacks savings in the second pillar are calculated into annual pension benefits.
2nd pillar Currently, this rate is at 6.8%. The bill proposes a lowering to 6%.
Cutbacks in Switzerland has generous widows’ pensions for all married women below Retrenchment
widows’ the age of 64. The reform proposal suggests that in the future, only
pensions widows with dependent children should receive such a pension.
Increase in Currently, the age of retirement in Switzerland is at 65 for men and 64 for Retrenchment
age of women. The reform proposes to equalize the retirement age for both men
retirement and women at 65. Right-wing parties demand a further increase to 67.
Subsidies for Currently, early retirement implies a significantly lower pension level (linear Compensation:
early cutbacks proportional to the years of early retirement). The bill proposed targeting
retirement to subsidize early retirement for low-income workers only.
Extended The second pillar of occupational pensions in Switzerland insures only Compensation:
eligibility incomes above ca. 24’000 CHF/year. This is detrimental to workers who recalibration
2nd pillar work part-time or combine several part-time contracts. As part-time work
is very predominantly female in Switzerland, this issue affects
mainly women. The reform bill proposed to lower the access
threshold, so that about 150’000 women would be newly insured
Increased Pensions in Switzerland are financed by about 75% via pay-roll Compensation:
revenues contributions. In addition, the government contributes to financing with increased
(VAT) revenues from income taxation and from VAT. The government suggests revenues
to increase VAT earmarked for the basic pension system.
3.2 The experimental design
Studying the “politics of trade-offs” requires that we identify the relative importance of
different reform elements. When a reform package contains both - elements that a voter
rejects and elements that he/she favors - the voter will perform an (implicit) balancing
of the relative preference importance, which eventually determines whether he/she sup-
ports or rejects the reform package as a whole. Standard surveys do not allow us to
measure relative preference importance (for a similar critique, see Busemeyer & Garritz-
mann, 2017). Generally, support levels are very high for expansive social policies and
very low for retrenchment. However, from this information, we cannot evaluate public
opinion on actual welfare state reforms, since these reforms are usually multidimensional.
In addition, standard survey questions (even if they ask about priorities) artificially sep-
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arate attitudes on individual elements of policy change. However, in actual preferences
over reforms, these elements are linked, and a voter may evaluate a measure differently
depending on the other elements of the reform, for instance if a voter values the coher-
ence of a reform package. Therefore, a standard random utility model that infers overall
utility from several, separately measured components is unable to estimate overall utility
correctly (Horiuchi, Smith & Yamamoto, 2015).
We use conjoint survey analysis as a more appropriate tool to analyze current wel-
fare politics, because it precisely prompts respondents to choose between different policy
packages. It is therefore perfectly suited to examine individual preferences in the context
of multidimensional reforms. Moreover, the conjoint design has been shown to approx-
imate real-world decisions more closely than vignette designs (Hainmueller, Hangartner
& Yamamoto, 2015). Conjoint designs have a long history in psychology, marketing and
sociology (Green, Krieger & Wind, 2001; Wallander, 2009) but they have only recently
started to spread in political science, with a few pioneering studies showing the substan-
tial value for political science research questions (Bechtel, Hainmueller & Margalit, 2014;
Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Bechtel, Genovese & Scheve, 2016; Gallego & Marx, 2016;
Ballard-Rosa, Martin & Scheve, 2017) and providing methodological support for applica-
tions in political science (Hainmueller, Hopkins & Yamamoto, 2014; Hainmueller et al.,
2015).
We designed and implemented our experiment as follows: First, we specified the core
elements of the reform package (attributes) and different values of each reform element
(levels). Second, reform packages were generated randomly. They contained the whole
set of attributes (in random order), and a random composition of levels. Finally, survey
respondents were presented with two hypothetical reform packages to compare and eval-
uate. More specifically, they were asked to indicate a) which of the two reform packages
they prefer (the “choice” variable), and b) how likely they would be to support each of
the two reform packages individually in a popular referendum (the “ranking variable”,
similar to Bechtel et al., 2014). Through randomization and a high number of such pair-
wise comparisons, this empirical strategy allows us to identify – and quantify – the causal
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effect individual reform elements have on the support for the entire reform, compared to
a reform that contains the baseline category of a particular attribute.
The definition of attributes and levels is, obviously, key for both internal and external
validity of the experiment. In our case, we identified 6 key elements of the ongoing reform
and we defined 3 values for each element, according to the same principle: status quo,
government proposal, claims to go beyond the government proposal. Table 5 shows the
design. It was important for us to include only levels that are realistic and that were
actually debated in the public debate, which is why for recalibration, we defined only two
values.8
Each respondent compared 5 pairs of hypothetical reform packages9 and had to make
a decision between the two of them (forced choice) before being able to continue the
survey. All respondents were also forced to indicate their level of support for each reform
package in a referendum (see supplementary information (Appendix A) for a screenshot
of the experimental design). Our design results in more than 18’000 (1873 respondents x
5 comparison a 2 reform packages) ratings on randomly generated reform packages.
Given the complexity of the task, two concerns regarding internal and external validity
need to be addressed: the specificity of the attributes/levels, and respondent fatigue.
Regarding the specificity of the levels, one may first ask if the reform elements we include
are so specific that they limit the external validity of the findings, because it would be
unrealistic to assume that citizens would know about specific reform elements in other
countries. We suggest that our findings do travel beyond the context of Switzerland,
because public opinion on and public contestation of welfare reforms is always specific
and focused on particular measures (think e.g. of Articolo 18 in Italien labor law or
the “CDD” – fixed-term contracts – in France, two highly specific elements that became
8In our experiment combinations of levels are possible. The design could exclude certain combinations
that are impossible or unlikely (at the cost of the benefits of randomization); we did not exclude any
combinations, however, because all packages are politically possible. The only restriction we imposed
prevented the display of two exactly identical packages.
9To prepare respondents for their task, the survey questionnaire started with multiple screens that
explained the overall structure of the pension system, the context of the reform, as well as the meaning of
the reform attributes. Respondents could also ask for more information on the different reform elements
later while comparing the hypothetical packages, by clicking on info buttons.
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Table 2: Reform elements that are being discussed (attributes and values)
Reform elements Values Goal of the
(Attributes) reform elements
Pension cutbacks 1: status quo No cuts (6.8% conversion rate) Retrenchment
2nd pillar 2: government Cutbacks. Balance the lowering of pension
proposal levels by having people contribute more.
3: beyond gvt Cutbacks. No balancing.
Cutbacks in 1: status quo All widows below 64 are eligible for benefits Retrenchment
widows’ pensions 2: government Only widows with children <16 years should be
proposal eligible
3: beyond gvt Stepwise abolishment of widows’ pensions
Increase in age of 1: status quo 64 for women, 65 for men Retrenchment
retirement 2: government Increase for women by 1 year: 65 for both
proposal
3: beyond gvt Stepwise increase for both men & women to 67
Subsidies for 1: status quo Early retirement allowed, but with linear Compensation:
early retirement cutback in the benefit level targeting
2: government Early retirement subsidized for lower-income
proposal earners
3: beyond gvt Early retirement subsidized for all
Extended elibility 1: status quo No change. Only people earning >24’000 CHF/year Compensation:
2nd pillar are eligible recalibration
2: government Extend access for people with lower incomes
proposal and part-time workers
Increased revenues 1: status quo No increase in VAT Compensation:
(VAT) 2: government Increase of VAT by max. 1.5 percentage points increased
proposal revenues
3: beyond gvt Increase of VAT by max. 3 percentage points
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decisive elements of political contestation). Beyond this general observation, we have
worked to ensure that we included only those reform elements in the conjoint survey
that were actually politicized and visible: we defined attributes and levels based both
on the government report accompanying the reform proposal, as well as on the basis of
empirical analyses of the key elements in previous pension reforms and pension votes; we
then discussed our design with public servants of the Federal Office of Social Insurances,
i.e. the competent administrative office; furthermore, we implemented both a qualitative
pre-test, observing respondents via camera while they filled in the questionnaire (the
respondents were asked to articulate their thought-process while responding), as well as
a pre-test with 150 students; finally, we verified that all attributes/levels included – even
the more technical ones – were discussed prominently in the media, based on data from
the FOEG media observatory.10 Based on this procedure, we feel confident that despite
the task being specific, it adequately reflected opinion formation on this reform in the
public.
The second concern regarding the complexity of the attributes/levels is whether only
highly sophisticated voters/respondents would understand the reform proposals and be
able to interpret them as retrenchment/compensation, or whether less sophisticated vot-
ers would answer randomly or react to obfuscation rather than to compensation. This
is a concern that we have addressed mainly empirically, by cross-validating our conjoint
findings with more simple direct questions; by controlling for education and empirically
comparing the consistency in the answers of high- and low-education respondents; and
by comparing the coefficient sizes of more technical and more straightforward elements
(in order to test for obfuscation). The findings of these robustness tests (Appendix F)
confirm that the levels were understood and the survey task was understood consistently.
We discuss the findings of the robustness test in more detail in section 5.
Regarding respondent fatigue after the first tasks, we contain this risk in three ways:
we performed extensive quantitative (with students), as well as qualitative (with respon-
dents) pre-tests, observing respondents via camera while they filled in the questionnaire
10FOEG - Forschungsinstitut Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft, University of Zurich.
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(the respondents were asked to articulate their thought-process while responding). This
pre-test helped us design instructions that are most helpfully throughout the five paired
comparisons. Second, we measured time stamps throughout the survey, in order to detect
and exclude respondents who click too quickly through the comparisons (this affected less
than 3% of the respondents). Finally, we estimated all results based on the first two (out
of five) conjoint comparisons only, assuming that people’s concentration was strongest in
the beginning of the task. The findings are entirely robust (see Appendix C).
3.3 Data and estimation strategy
The survey was conducted in both the French and the German speaking parts of Switzer-
land among an original, representative sample of Swiss citizens between March and June
2015 (after a pre-test in February), implemented by the survey company “gfs.bern”. It
contains 1’873 fully completed interviews. Random sampling was done on the basis of
the national telephone register, which indicates the first phone number an individual
registered (mobile or landline number). Respondents were recruited via CATI interview,
in which they indicated their e-mail address. They then received within 24h an e-mail
with their access code to the online survey. Respondents were – if needed – reminded
three times (via e-mail after 2 and after 3 weeks, and via telephone after 4 weeks). Our
sampling strategy was based on quota for the region, age and gender, drawn from the
national census. We chose to oversample respondents over 65, because this age group usu-
ally has lower participation rates in online surveys. Table 3 shows sampling and response
rates by region, age and sex. Our overall response rate was 63%, it was highest among
elderly men and lowest among young men and in the French speaking part of Switzerland.
In the analyses, we account for remaining bias from survey response using weights
created by iterative post-stratification. The weights adjust for region, age and gender
(based on known population margins) and party preference (based on the national election
results). Following the empirical strategy of Hainmuller et al. (2014), we estimate the
average marginal component effect (AMCE), i.e. the marginal effect of a specific level over
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Table 3: Response rates by language region, age, and sex
Region Recruited Login Completed
German 2307 1720 1570 (68%)
French 637 340 303 (45%)
Total 2980 2060 1873 (63%)
Age Recruited Login Completed
m f all m f all m f all
<40 390 379 769 168 247 415 157 (43%) 209 (55.1%) 366
40-64 572 611 1183 423 447 870 392 (68.5%) 399 (65.3%) 791
>65 462 566 1028 361 414 775 341 (73.8%) 375 (66.3%) 716
Total 1424 1556 2980 952 1108 2060 890 (63.5%) 983 (63.2%) 1873
the joint distribution of all other levels. Because each attribute and level was randomly
assigned (i.e. we choose a randomized design over a quota design), we can estimate the
AMCEs using a simple linear regression of the following form, where every respondent
(indexed as i) is presented with K conjoint comparisons (k) and in each comparison
chooses one of J alternatives (j):
chosenijk = ✓0 + ✓1[cutbacksijk = statusquo] + ✓2[widowspensionijk = retrench]
+ ✓3[retirementageijk = 65/65] + ...+ ✏ijk,
where chosenijk is coded as 1 if that hypothetical reform package was chosen and 0
otherwise, and [cutbacksijk = status quo], [widowspensionijk= retrench], etc. are dummy
variables coded as 1 if that value applies to the reform package and 0 otherwise. ✓̂ for e.g.
retirement age = 65/65 then is the average difference in the probability of a package being
chosen if it raises women’s retirement age by one year as compared to the status quo, with
the average being computed over all other possible combinations of levels. The analysis
of the conjoint data was done with the cjoint package in the R language (Hainmueller
et al., 2014), clustered standard errors account for multiple pairwise ratings of reform
packages by each respondent.
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4 Findings: Effects of Retrenchment and Compen-
sation on Support
Our first hypothesis states that compensation is effective in counter-balancing opposition
against retrenchment. To gauge this effect empirically, Figure 2 presents the findings
of the conjoint analysis for the full sample of respondents. Figure 2 first lists the three
retrenchment elements of the reform package: cutback in benefits levels of 2nd pillar pen-
sions, cutbacks in widows’ pensions and a higher retirement age, followed by the different
compensating elements. The coefficients indicate for each attribute value the average
change in the probability of supporting a reform package if the package includes the re-
spective value instead of the baseline value (status quo). Negative coefficients indicate
that a specific attribute value would reduce overall support.
As expected, we see that pension retrenchment (pension cutbacks, lower widows’ pen-
sions and a general increase in the age of retirement) clearly, significantly and sometimes
massively reduce support for the reform. Raising women’s retirement age from 64 to 65,
by contrast, increases support for the overall reform. It seems that most voters do not
perceive this change as retrenchment, but rather as a measure of updating/gender equal-
ization. Hence, a first finding confirms that – even when presented in a reform package
– retrenchment elements considerably lower the chances of the reform. Can expansive
elements compensate for this loss of support? When we compare the average effects of
different compensation strategies, we see that their effects differ strongly: Subsidies for
the lower-income earners in favor of their possibility to retire early are a form of targeting
compensation. In our sample, however, they do not increase the support for the entire
reform significantly. Even though the coefficient is slightly positive, this reform element
is not salient enough in the entire sample of respondents to reach significance. The same
holds for the compensation via increased revenues from VAT (1.5%); a more massive tax
increase (3%) even reduces the chances of the reform package clearly. The compensation
strategy that significantly increases support for the entire package in the full sample of
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Note: Estimates shown are changes in probability of supporting a pension reform that includes the specific attribute value,
compared to a reform that includes the status quo. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
respondents is recalibration: extending eligibility to second pillar pensions for low income
earners and part-time workers (mostly women) increases the probability of a reform be-
ing accepted by almost 5 percentage points. In other words, this compensation is able to
counterbalance the cost of cutbacks, e.g. the lowering of 2nd pillar pensions.11
Alternatively, we can look at the effectiveness of compensation from a different per-
spective. Due to randomization of the attributes, our design involves both reform pack-
ages that include only little retrenchment and some very painful packages that consist
11One may argue that the idea of compensation pre-supposes that expansive elements are presented in
combination with retrenchment. Since all level combinations are possible, we also have packages that are
purely expansive in our sample. To test for robustness, we calculated the findings based on a sub-sample
of hypothetical packages that includes only those reforms that contain any kind of retrenchment. The
findings are robust (see Appendix C).
19
entirely of cutbacks. The underlying assumption of our design is that the overall support
for a reform package decreases the more retrenching elements it includes. Put differently,
as retrenchment implies lower expenditures, we would expect the popularity of a reform
package to be negatively related to the savings potential of a reform. The real-world
setting of our design allows to test the validity of this assumption. We computed the
aggregate cost implications of all 486 hypothetical reform packages on the basis of the
budgetary implications of the reform elements included (see Appendix B). Cost impli-
cations range from the most restrictive packages (only retrenchment, no compensation)
which would lead to a 10.6% expenditure reduction (9.8 bn/year) to the most expansive
ones (no cutbacks, only compensations) which would expand expenditures by 0.8% per
year (0.8bn/year). On the basis of the ranking variable (“how likely would you sup-
port this package in a referendum?”), the histogram in Figure 3 presents the distribution
of acceptance rates (dichotomized ranking variable) for each of the 486 packages. As
expected, the acceptance rate strongly varies, with some unpopular combinations of re-
form elements only supported by 20% of respondents or less and some packages being
supported by a overwhelming majority. The four foregrounded distributions (kernel den-
sities) take stock of the available information on the savings potential of each reform
element and demonstrate that more restrictive packages receive less popular support. To
generate these distributions, we ranked the reform packages according to their saving
potential (i.e. the severity of retrenchment) and split them into quartiles. The message
is clear: the more retrenchment a package involves, the lower the share of respondents
supporting it. However, an observable implication of our hypothesis 1 is that we should
also find retrenching reform packages — i.e. packages that imply a substantial decrease
of government expenditures — which would receive a majority of votes despite the in-
cluded cutbacks. This is indeed the case: Even among the second and third quartile
(retrenching pension expenditures by 2.3 to 6.3% annually), we find that a substantial
share of these reforms receive acceptance rates above 0.5, that is, would enjoy popular
support of at least 50%. Reform packages that include very weak or no compensation
(the fourth quartile), however, hardly ever gather majority support and thus would not
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stand a chance in a popular referendum.







































































































Weak Retrenchment (65.8% Acceptance)
Weak−Medium Retrenchment (45.8% Acceptance)
Medium−Strong Retrenchment (31.6% Acceptance)
Strong Retrenchment (13.8% Acceptance)
Note: X axis: share of positive responses to the question: “If you had to vote on package X in a popular referendum,
would you support the reform or reject it?” Left Y axis denotes the bars, right Y axis the lines. Lines: all hypothetical
reform package combinations (total of 486) have been divided into quartiles, depending on their impact on the reduction
of expenditures (retrenchment). The cutoff-points of the four quartiles are expenditure cuts of 5.79 bn/year, 4.18 bn/year
and 2.07 bn/year. Cost implications are based on the official estimates as reported in Appendix B.
4.1 Interactions with respondent characteristics
Hypothesis 2 suggests that lower-income people should respond particularly strongly to
compensations that target their specific pension rights. Subsidies for early retirement are
such a compensation, but also the extension of the eligibility to second pillar pensions
has some (limited) traction for lower-income earners? pensions. Accordingly, Figure 4
shows the conjoint findings for individuals living in lower-income households12 compared
12We define lower-income individuals as those living in households with a combined income of below
6000 CHF/month. This corresponds to the median individual income in Switzerland and represents 1.5
times the threshold the government defined for individuals to be eligible for subsidies for early retirement.
Pensioners are excluded, as their pensions would not be affected by the compensations.
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to higher income classes.
We find that among lower income earners, targeted subsidies indeed increase support
for the reform by 5.7 percentage points, while the middle- and higher income earners are
basically indifferent towards these reform elements. However, even though the effect is
significant among the lower-income earners, the difference between the income groups is
not (see right panel of Figure 4; Appendix D provides the full list of coefficients).
Figure 4: By income: effects of reform elements on support for the pension reform package
Medium/high income (N=785) Low income (N=179)
Difference:
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Note: Estimates shown are changes in probability of supporting a pension reform that includes the specific attribute value,
compared to a reform that includes the status quo. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Recalibration more strongly increases support for the reform packages among lower-
income earners than it does among the higher income groups. Again, the difference
between the two subgroups is not significant. Hence, income as such does not seem to be
a very strong predictor of the specific relative importance different compensations have
for different groups. Attitudes among lower-income earners are not sufficiently distinct
from those of higher income groups to make such a claim.13
13Nevertheless, of course, compensations do work among this group: 27.5% of reform packages that
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Figure 5: By gender: effects of reform elements on support for the pension reform package
Men (N=539) Women (N=606)
Difference:








−0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
PENSION CUTBACKS 2ND PILLAR     
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   cutbacks − balancing
   cutbacks − no balancing
CUTBACKS IN WIDOW’S PENSIONS    
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   Restriction
   Abolishment
INCREASE IN AGE OF RETIREMENT   
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   65 men&women
   67 men&women
SUBSIDIES FOR EARLY RETIREMENT
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   Targeted subsidies
   Subsidies for all
EXTENDED ELIGIBILITY 2ND PILLAR  
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   Extend for low−income/part−time
INCREASED REVENUES (VAT)            
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   increase max. 1.5%
   increase max. 3%
Change in Pr(Support for Reform Package)
Note: Estimates shown are changes in probability of supporting a pension reform that includes the specific attribute value,
compared to a reform that includes the status quo. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Differences are stronger when we compare active men and women (pensioners are
excluded here since the cutbacks would not affect them) based on their relative material
interests in the compensations offered. We suggested that if material interests drive the
effectiveness of compensations, women should be more responsive to recalibration than
men, as the extension of eligibility to second pillar occupational pensions affects mostly
women. About 85% of employed women in Switzerland work only part-time. Extending
access to the second pillar as proposed by the government would have newly granted oc-
cupational pension rights to more than 150’000 women. Indeed, recalibration (extending
eligibility for 2nd pillar pensions) increases support for the reform significantly by 6.1
percentage points among women, while the effect is small and not significant for men
(Figure 5). Unlike the difference between income groups, the difference between men and
include pension cutbacks in the 2nd pillar still receive majority support among lower-income individuals
who explicitly reject such cutbacks if they include recalibration measures. However, this pattern is not
distinctive enough to support income as a determinant of compensation effectiveness.
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women with regard to recalibration is significant (see Appendix D in the supplementary
information). Overall, it appears that compensating women is particularly important
for the success of reform, since some of the gender-specific, restrictive elements of the
reform (lowering widows’ pensions, increase women’s retirement age by 1 year) generate
stronger resistance against the entire package among women than among men: regarding
the government proposal (see Table 1), men oppose only pension cutbacks, which would
affect them directly, while they are supportive of increasing women’s retirement age and
they are indifferent with regard to restricting widows’ pensions. Hence, it seems that
among men, such a reform overall should generally have a better chance of being sup-
ported than among women (in line with Figure 1). Indeed, the government seemed aware
that women’s votes would have to be won in this process, as it explicitly argued that
since several of the cutbacks bear more heavily on women than on men, women’s overall
pension rights should be particularly improved in the second pillar.14 According to our
results, this strategy is indeed effective: overall, among those women who reject pension
cutbacks explicitly, 25.5% of the reform packages that contain precisely such cutbacks
would nevertheless receive majority support.
Finally, we test partisanship as a determinant of the effectiveness of different com-
pensation strategies. Figure 1 showed that left-wing voters in Switzerland are strongly
opposed to retrenching pensions. Also, in all past referenda, it was the Social Democrats
and/or trade unions that launched the referenda against reforms and that led the cam-
paigns (that were eventually won with the votes of far more citizens than the left-wing
voters only, of course). Hence, for a government seeking to strengthen support for a
reform, it seems particularly important to foster support among the Left.
We suggested that retrenchment should reduce support more strongly among left-
wing voters than among center-right voters; in addition, H4 posits that recalibration,
targeting and increased revenue should increase support for the reform among left voters
more strongly than among voters of the center-right or the far-right, because they address
long-standing claims that the left has raised regarding the expansion of old age income
14Faktenblatt: Altersvorsorge 2020. Was die Reform fur die Frauen bedeutet. Bundesamt fuer
Sozialversicherungen (BVS), Bern. https://tinyurl.com/altersvorsorge2020-female
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Figure 6: By party affiliation: effects of reform elements on support for the pension
reform
Far right (N=225) Moderate right (N=426) Left (N=436)
Difference:
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Note: Estimates shown are changes in probability of supporting a pension reform that includes the specific attribute value,
compared to a reform that includes the status quo. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
security.
Figure 6 compares attitudes of left-wing voters (Green party and Social Democrats) to
those among voters of the moderate right (Christian Democrats and Liberals) and voters
of the far right (Swiss People’s Party). In the right-hand panel, we show whether left-wing
voters differ significantly from moderate right voters, because these are the parties that
are the main opponents in this policy field (among the Far right, the party elite supports
retrenchment, but their voters do not, which is why the SVP tends to avoid the spotlight
in the reform process). First, we find that pension retrenchment reduces the overall
support for the reform among all voters (except for the equalization of the retirement age
for men and women). However, left-wing voters are indeed more skeptical of the more
drastic retrenchment measures discussed (the difference among left-wing voters and the
moderate right is significant regarding unbalanced benefit cuts and an increase in the
retirement age to 67).
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In terms of compensation, we see exactly the pattern we would expect: targeted subsi-
dies for the early retirement of low-wage earners (targeting), better occupational pensions
for women (recalibration), as well as moderately increased revenues via VAT significantly
and strongly increase the support for the entire reform package among left-wing vot-
ers (by 5-9 percentage points), whereas they do not among the voters of the (both far
and moderate) right. Left-wing voters clearly respond more positively to compensations
via targeting and recalibration than right-wing voters. Hence, compensations make re-
trenchment acceptable among left-wing voters: 30.2% of all reform packages that include
pension cutbacks still receive majority support among those left voters who explicitly
rejected precisely this measure in our survey (in a direct question about these cutbacks).
In terms of a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of different compensation
strategies, Table 4 provides the average marginal component effects of the different com-
pensating elements for the various sub-groups we have focused on. The coefficients in
the cells are simply the coefficients shown in the above figures (95% confidence inter-
val below.) When asking which compensation strategy works among which groups, two
findings are particularly noteworthy: first, recalibration is most effective in generating
support for the overall reform package among all subgroups. In other words: it is the most
important compensating factor. Second, partisanship is a more forceful predictor of the
effectiveness of compensations than socio-economic conditions, as all three compensation
strategies have most traction among left-wing voters.
5 Robustness checks
Conjoint surveys are generally cognitively demanding for respondents, as they are asked
to evaluate several elements in combination and – what is even more – to compare one
combination of elements to another combination. Hence, there are several concerns re-
garding the validity and robustness of our findings that we want to address directly: in
terms of internal validity, one may ask whether conjoint evaluations are answered ran-
domly when respondents become tired of the complex task. In addition, the specific
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Table 4: Effects of different compensation strategies on reform support among sub-groups
of respondents
Targeting Recalibration
(subsidize early (extend access to
retirement for second pillar pensions Increased revenues
lower-income earners) for women) (Increase VAT by 1.5pp)
Full sample 0.012 0.045 0.008
[0.033 -0.009] [0.062 0.028] [0.030 -0.014]
Lower income 0.057 0.081 -0.002
respondents [0.112 0.001] [0.131 0.032] [0.064 -0.067]
Women 0.029 0.061 -0.005
[0.063 -0.005] [0.090 0.033] [0.031 -0.042]
Left voters 0.074 0.087 0.052
[0.113 0.035] [0.121 0.053] [0.092 0.012]
formulation of reform options (i.e. values) may affect how respondents understand and
evaluate the packages. On top of this, problems of sampling and survey design (we used a
CATI recruitment of respondents) may affect the internal validity of the findings. When
it comes to concerns about external validity, the choice and specification of the reform
elements (attributes) can be questioned. Since we have one particular instance of a target-
ing or recalibrating reform element, can we conclude on the effectiveness of recalibration
overall, or only on this specific kind of recalibration? Furthermore, we fielded the survey
at a specific point in time regarding the public debate on the ongoing reform in the me-
dia. The relative importance respondents attribute to the different reform elements may
therefore be situational and reflect a snapshot of the mediatized debate. Finally, one may
wonder if the findings only hold for highly sophisticaed, highly informed citizens (which
is a concern to both internal and external validity).
We address these legitimate concerns via a series of robustness checks. First, we
address concerns about the effect of respondent fatigue by estimating the key findings on
the basis of the first two conjoint comparisons only. The findings are entirely consistent
(see Appendix C in the supplementary information), indicating that those respondents
who engaged with the task kept their attention for all five conjoint pairs. This positive
finding is also confirmed by an evaluation of time stamps (the time respondents spend on
each pairwise comparison) and of dropouts during the conjoint task. Both evaluations
show that respondents engage in all 5 comparisons seriously and that once they decide
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to engage with the task they follow it through. Only 5.4 percent of the respondents drop
out by the start of the conjoint-task (which is the first task in the overall survey).
Second, we repeated a very similar, but not identical survey on the same pension
reform with a new sample about one year after the first fieldwork was completed. This
second survey differs in the following respects: A) sampling strategy: while for the first
survey, we recruited respondents based on the register of Swiss landline phone numbers
via CATI, we sampled for the second survey based on the official statistical register of the
Swiss population and invitation via letter. B) We changed one of the six attributes of the
survey, since in the parliamentary debates, the targeting element of the first government
proposal (subsidize early retirement) was changed to an alternative targeting element
(increase basic pensions by a certain amount per month). This allowed us to test the
robustness of the component effect depending on the particular kind of targeting com-
pensation. C) We slightly adapted the formulation of the levels (specific reform elements)
to reflect the evolving policy proposal. This adaptation allows us to check the robustness
of the findings to slight changes in the formulation of levels. And D) the second survey
being fielded more than one year after the first one, the context in terms of public debate
on the reform had changed. While in 2015, the reform was not in parliament yet (hence
the public debate in the media had only started), it was more heavily discussed in the
media in mid-2016 (i.e. at the time of the second survey), as the process was then in the
middle of parliamentary debates. Hence, we can see if our findings are robust to changes
in the public opinion context.
Appendix E provides information about and the findings of this second survey. The
overall picture is very clear: the findings are robust to the changes in sampling, survey
design and context. Comparing the findings of the two surveys, we see an almost iden-
tical pattern: retrenchment of 2nd pillar pensions is highly unpopular, especially if it is
not balanced with higher contribution payments. Also, a general increase in the age of
retirement and restrictions of widows’ pensions negatively affect support for the overall
package. The finding on recalibrating reform elements is also robust: extending eligibility
to low-income and part-time workers significantly increases the popular support for the
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reform (while part-time only does so, but not significantly). We also confirm that women
and left-wing voters support recalibration more strongly than men and right-wing voters.
Finally, as in the first survey, increasing revenues through VAT increases support only
among left-wing voters. These findings are robust to slightly different formulations of the
levels.
The only difference we find concerns targeting compensation. While targeting com-
pensation (subsidize early retirement for lower-income earners) increased support for the
reform in 2015 (first wave) only among left-wing voters, but not among any other group,
the targeting compensation included in the 2016 is more effective (and much more gener-
ous). In 2016, the upper chamber in Parliament proposed to increase basic pension levels
by a fixed amount per month for all recipients. Despite being a universalistic measure,
this change would benefit lower-income earners most (which is why we still qualify it as
targeting), since the basic pensions are highly redistributive. This compensation measure
increases support significantly in the overall sample, among left-wing voters, women and
lower income-earners. These findings suggests that targeting may not be overall a less
effective compensation strategy than recalibration, but its effect depends on the specific
measures proposed.
Finally, Appendix F tests whether the results differ between unsophisticated and
sophisticated voters (defining sophisticated voters as those with tertiary education, which
is strongly correlated empirically with political interest and political knowledge). First,
we want to see if respondents with higher and lower education were equally consistent in
performing the conjoint task. For this, we estimate the AMCES for three different splits
of the five paired comparisons, and for low- and highly educated respondents separately.
We then correlate the AMCES of the first 2 (or 3) comparisons with the AMCES of
the second set of comparisons. Since the distribution of respondents with and without
tertiary education is highly skewed in our sample (about 1/3 with tertiary education
and 2/3 without), we draw 1000 repeated random samples and compare the average of
computed correlation measures. All comparison show that less sophisticated respondents
have performed the task just as consistently as more sophisticated respondents. Beyond
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this, table 6 in Appendix D also shows that the findings are robust for a simple control for
tertiary education. Moreover, we test whether more and less educated respondents have
answered the conjoint tasks consistently with direct, simple survey questions on specific
reform elements. Our survey contains three direct questions on reform elements that
correspond directly to conjoint levels. Hence, we correlate the individual-level answers
respondents gave on these direct questions (likert scales, 1-4) with individual-level AMCE,
estimated on the basis of the 10 conjoint packages each respondent has evaluated, again for
1000 randomly drawn samples of high- and low-educated respondents. Several estimators
of correlation (see Appendix F.2) indicate robustly that while the more highly educated
respondents are - as expected - somewhat more coherent in their answers, the coherence
between the two groups never differs significantly. Based on all these tests, we feel
confident that the conjoint task was understood and performed well by both more and
less sophisticated respondents.
6 Conclusions
The question under what conditions welfare states can be reformed in times of austerity
has become crucial in research on welfare politics. Compensation as a strategy to foster
support for reform is one of the key explanations. Compensating (parts of) the opponents
of welfare reforms may divide – and thereby lower – opposition, because it presents
opponents with a trade-off: while they reject certain elements of a reform, they are
interested in securing other elements. Conjoint analysis is able to capture precisely the
micro-level mechanisms of evaluating trade-offs. It allows us to answer empirically a
range of crucial research questions regarding the politics of compensation: Are there
policy reform packages that receive majority support when combining retrenchment and
compensation? Which compensation strategies are most effective? And what factors
determine the effectiveness of different kinds of compensation among particular social
groups?
On the basis of our original survey among 1873 Swiss voters, we have shown that
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the retrenchment of existing benefit levels is indeed highly unpopular. About 60 percent
of respondents consider lower pension benefits unacceptable. Even when retrenchment
is embedded in a wider, more balanced, reform package, it has a clear negative effect
on the acceptance of the reform. More concretely, lowering pension benefit levels in the
occupational pension pillar reduce the probability of a reform being accepted in a direct
democratic referendum by 5 to 10 percentage points (the average marginal component ef-
fect), compared to a reform proposal that retains the status quo in terms of benefit levels.
This reflects the “cost” in terms of public opinion that compensation needs to counter-
balance. Different compensation strategies are able to counter-balance this negative effect
on reform support: Adapting the architecture of the pension system to new social risks
(recalibration) has the strongest and most consistent positive effect on reform support:
it increases the chances of a reform being accepted significantly by about 5 percentage
points in the full sample and by about 6-8 percentage points among the main beneficia-
ries (women and lower income earners). Expansion for lower income earners (targeting)
has a more variable effect: when it comes in the form of subsidies for early retirement,
it does not increase the chances of a reform significantly among the entire population,
but only among the main beneficiaries (low income earners). Targeting is more effective
when designed more widely, i.e. in the form of generally higher basic pensions.
However, our findings also show that material conditions only take us so far in explain-
ing citizens’ responses to compensation. Partisanship has stronger effects in predicting
citizens’ responses: compensation has clear and positive effects among voters of the Left.
Both, targeting and recalibration, increase the probability of a reform package being ac-
cepted by about 7 and 9 percentage points respectively. Increasing revenues (from VAT)
add about 5 percentage points of support. This is an important finding, given the fact
that it is usually the Left that organizes opposition against pension cutbacks (not only
in Switzerland). If the government manages to divide the left-wing opposition against
retrenchment, the chances of a reform increase.
These findings obviously bear important implications for the reform capacity of mature
welfare states in an era of permanent financial constraint. Not only do they show that
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broad reform packages are more likely to gather sufficient support than narrow reform
proposals, but they also confirm that structural and institutional constraints are not
deterministic. Rather, agency and politics matter: governments do have ample room for
maneuver to tailor compensations to the relevant opposition groups.
Beyond these specific findings on compensation and reform capacity, we want to em-
phasize the potential and usefulness of conjoint analysis for the study of current welfare
politics. We see four main assets of conjoint analysis. First, almost all current research on
welfare state change relies on theoretical arguments involving individual-level preferences
and public opinion as a key mechanism in political dynamics. However, we know from
survey research that when asked directly, most people tend to support generous welfare
spending in all areas, just as they support low tax levels (which is why we have such
skewed distributions in general survey questions on the welfare state). It is hard to add
constraints to such questions in a way that reveals more narrow preferences and increases
variance. Conjoint analysis allows to model realistic constraints directly.
Introducing such realistic constraints is – and this is our second point – particularly
important in current welfare state research, since most of our theoretical arguments actu-
ally rely on assumptions regarding policy priorities rather than policy position. Almost
all respondents reject pension retrenchment, but this retrenchment does not have the
same importance for all respondents. Priorities have become highly relevant politically,
because the context of contemporary welfare politics resembles a zero-sum distributive
game, where gains for some social groups come at the expense of other groups. In this
context, conjoint analysis provides us with a tool to conceptualize and measure the rel-
ative importance of multiple desirable goals. It has therefore tremendous potential for
applications in welfare state research way beyond the question of retrenchment and reform
capacity.
Third, conjoint analysis is an experimental survey technique. Its strength therefore
naturally lies in internal validity more so than in external validity. However, we have
reason to think that conjoint analysis provides more external validity than traditional
survey experiments (Hainmueller et al., 2014, p. 27): conjoint pairs can be designed in a
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highly realistic way and may therefore capture actual opinion-formation processes more
adequately than traditional surveys that tend to place respondents in a more artificial
situation. In the real world, citizens evaluate policy packages when deciding about their
support for a reform, a government or a party. Hence, conjoint surveys may actually
achieve more external validity than traditional surveys.
Finally, and because of the realistic decision-making situation conjoint analysis can
create for respondents, the policy-relevance of our empirical findings may be higher than
with traditional survey research that is unable to capture the complexity and multidi-
mensionality of the decisions at hand.
One of the downsides of conjoint analysis, however, is that the findings may not be
very robust, since they depend on the precise choice and wording of the attributes/values,
and they may depend on the current public debate (i.e. reflect momentary snapshots of
the public debate than stable preferences). In our article, we were able to contain these
problems via a robustness survey that tested similar, but not identical attributes/values
and that was fielded roughly one year after the first data collection. However, future
research may want to go beyond this by theorizing and testing explicitly the context effect
of public debates on the relative importance citizens attribute to particular compensations
via either longitudinal or comparative designs.
33
References
Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Martin, Lucy, & Scheve, Kenneth (2017). The structure of
American income tax policy preferences. The Journal of Politics, 79 (1), (Forthcoming).
Bechtel, Michael, Genovese, Federica, & Scheve, Kenneth F. (2016). Interests, Norms, and
Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Cooperation.
British Journal of Political Science, (Forthcoming).
Bechtel, Michael M., Hainmueller, Jens, & Margalit, Yotam (2014). Preferences for
international redistribution: The divide over the Eurozone bailouts. American Journal
of Political Science, 58 (4), 835–856.
Bertrand, Marianne & Mullainathan, Sendhil (2001). Do People Mean What They Say?
Implications For Subjective Survey Data. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=260131.
Bonoli, Giuliano (2000). The politics of pension reform: institutions and policy change
in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bonoli, Giuliano (2005). The politics of the new social policies: providing coverage against
new social risks in mature welfare states. Policy & Politics, 33 (3), 431–449.
Bonoli, Giuliano & Natali, David (Eds.). (2012). The Politics of the New Welfare State.
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
Bornschier, Simon (2015). The new cultural conflict, polarization, and representation in
the Swiss party system, 1975–2011. Swiss Political Science Review, 21 (4), 680–701.
Brooks, Clem & Manza, Jeff (2008). Why welfare states persist: the importance of public
opinion in democracies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Busemeyer, Marius R. & Garritzmann, Julian L. (2017). Public opinion on policy and
budgetary trade-offs in European welfare states: evidence from a new comparative
survey. Journal of European Public Policy, 1–19.
34
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1999). Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Gallego, Aina & Marx, Paul (2016). Multi-dimensional preferences for labour market
reforms: a conjoint experiment. Journal of European Public Policy, 1–21.
Giger, Nathalie & Nelson, Moira (2011). The electoral consequences of welfare state
retrenchment: Blame avoidance or credit claiming in the era of permanent austerity?
European Journal of Political Research, 50 (1), 1–23.
Giger, Nathalie & Nelson, Moira (2013). The welfare state or the economy? Preferences,
constituencies, and strategies for retrenchment. European Sociological Review, 29 (5),
1083–1094.
Gingrich, Jane (2014). Visibility, values, and voters: The informational role of the welfare
state. The Journal of Politics, 76 (2), 565–580.
Green, Paul E., Krieger, Abba M., & Wind, Yoram (2001). Thirty years of conjoint
analysis: Reflections and prospects. Interfaces, 31, 56–73.
Hacker, Jacob S. (2004). Privatizing risk without privatizing the welfare state: The
hidden politics of social policy retrenchment in the United States. American Political
Science Review, 98 (02), 243–260.
Hainmueller, Jens, Hangartner, Dominik, & Yamamoto, Teppei (2015). Validating vi-
gnette and conjoint survey experiments against real-world behavior. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 112 (8), 2395–2400.
Hainmueller, Jens & Hopkins, Daniel J. (2014). The Hidden American Immigration
Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants. American Journal
of Political Science, 59 (3), 529–548.
Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D. J., & Yamamoto, T. (2014). Causal Inference in Conjoint
Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments.
Political Analysis, 22 (1), 1–30.
35
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B Expenditures
Table 5: Expenditures for different reform elements
Reform element Values Change in Source of the
expenditures Estimate
Pension cutbacks 1: status quo 0
2nd pillar 2: Cutbacks. Balanced with -1406 mn/year BBI 2014
higher contribution payments
3: Cutbacks. No balancing -4116 mn/year BBI 2014
Cutbacks in 1: status quo 0
widows’ pensions 2: Restriction of eligibility -359 mn/year BBI 2014
3: Stepwise abolishment -960 mn/year BSV 2016
Increase in age of 1: status quo 0
retirement 2: 65 for men and women -1114 mn/year BBI 2014
3: Stepwise increase for both men -4700 mn/year BBI 2014
& women to 67
Subsidies for 1: status quo 0
early retirement 2: Subsidies for lower-income earners +390 mn/year BBI 2014
Extended elibility 1: status quo 0
2nd pillar 2: Extend access for people with +400 mn/year BBI 2014
lower incomes and
part-time workers
Increased revenues 1: status quo 0
(VAT) 2: Increase by max. 1.5 pp 0 (revenue increase of BSV 2014
3600 mn/year)
3: Increase by max. 3 pp 0 (revenue increase of BSV 2014
7200 mn/year)
Sources:
BBl 2014: Botschaft zur Reform der Altersvorsorge 2020 vom 19. November 2014 (Official bill proposal
by the Federal Government to the Parliament), Bundesblatt, reference number 14.088.
https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/bundesrecht/bundesblatt.html.
BSV 2016: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen. Schweizerische Sozialversicherungsstatistik 2016 (Offi-
cial social insurance statistics of 2016). Bern.
www.bsv.admin.ch/bsv/de/home/sozialversicherungen/ueberblick/grsv/statistik.html.
BSV 2014: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen. Zusammenfassung der Vernehmlassungsergebnisse




C Robustness checks I
First and second pair only









−0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
PENSION CUTBACKS 2ND PILLAR     
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   cutbacks − balancing
   cutbacks − no balancing
CUTBACKS IN WIDOW’S PENSIONS    
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   Restriction
   Abolishment
INCREASE IN AGE OF RETIREMENT   
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   65 men&women
   67 men&women
SUBSIDIES FOR EARLY RETIREMENT
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   Targeted subsidies
   Subsidies for all
EXTENDED ELIGIBILITY 2ND PILLAR  
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   Extend for low−income/part−time
INCREASED REVENUES (VAT)            
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   increase max. 1.5%
   increase max. 3%
Change in Pr(Support for Reform Package)
Note: Findings based on a sub-sample of hypothetical packages that includes only the first two (out of
five) conjoint comparisons. N = 7492 packages.
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Excluding expansive packages









−0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
PENSION CUTBACKS 2ND PILLAR     
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   cutbacks − balancing
   cutbacks − no balancing
CUTBACKS IN WIDOW’S PENSIONS    
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   Restriction
   Abolishment
INCREASE IN AGE OF RETIREMENT   
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   65 men&women
   67 men&women
SUBSIDIES FOR EARLY RETIREMENT
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   Targeted subsidies
   Subsidies for all
EXTENDED ELIGIBILITY 2ND PILLAR  
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   Extend for low−income/part−time
INCREASED REVENUES (VAT)            
   (Baseline = Status quo)
   increase max. 1.5%
   increase max. 3%
Change in Pr(Support for Reform Package)
Note: Findings based on a sub-sample of hypothetical packages that includes only those reforms that
contain any kind of retrenchment. Of 18730 packages, 683 contained no retrenchment.
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D Robustness checks II: Controls
Table 6: Full models, control for education
Model 1 Model 2
Control variables
(Intercept) 0.620 0.621
[0.590; 0.649] [0.591; 0.650]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - balancing −0.046 −0.045
[−0.067; −0.025] [−0.066; −0.024]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - no balancing −0.094 −0.094
[−0.115; −0.073] [−0.115; −0.072]
Widows PensionsRestriction −0.042 −0.042
[−0.065; −0.020] [−0.065; −0.019]
Widows PensionsAbolishment −0.155 −0.155
[−0.177; −0.133] [−0.177; −0.133]
Retirement Age65 men&women 0.075 0.075
[0.054; 0.096] [0.054; 0.096]
Retirement Age67 men&women −0.085 −0.084
[−0.109; −0.060] [−0.108; −0.059]
Early RetirementTargeted subsidies 0.012 0.012
[−0.009; 0.033] [−0.009; 0.033]
Early RetirementSubsidies for all −0.003 −0.004
[−0.024; 0.017] [−0.024; 0.017]
Eligibility 2nd PillarExtend for low-income/part-time 0.045 0.045
[0.028; 0.062] [0.028; 0.061]
VATincrease max. 1.5% 0.008 0.008
[−0.014; 0.030] [−0.014; 0.030]
VATincrease max. 3% −0.095 −0.095





Num. obs. 18730 18660
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Table 7: Models low and high income, control for ideology, age, gender
Model 1 Model 2
Control variables
(Intercept) 0.665 0.669
[0.621; 0.708] [0.623; 0.714]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - balancing −0.045 −0.045
[−0.076; −0.015] [−0.076; −0.015]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - no balancing −0.113 −0.113
[−0.145; −0.082] [−0.145; −0.082]
Widows PensionsRestriction −0.060 −0.060
[−0.094; −0.025] [−0.095; −0.026]
Widows PensionsAbolishment −0.173 −0.173
[−0.206; −0.140] [−0.206; −0.140]
Retirement Age65 men&women 0.057 0.057
[0.025; 0.088] [0.025; 0.088]
Retirement Age67 men&women −0.114 −0.114
[−0.150; −0.078] [−0.150; −0.078]
Early RetirementTargeted subsidies 0.003 0.003
[−0.029; 0.034] [−0.028; 0.035]
Early RetirementSubsidies for all −0.014 −0.013
[−0.042; 0.015] [−0.042; 0.015]
Eligibility 2nd PillarExtend for low-income/part-time 0.038 0.039
[0.014; 0.063] [0.014; 0.063]
VATincrease max. 1.5% 0.009 0.009
[−0.024; 0.041] [−0.024; 0.042]
VATincrease max. 3% −0.103 −0.103
[−0.136; −0.071] [−0.136; −0.071]
Low income −0.053 −0.052
[−0.144; 0.038] [−0.143; 0.039]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - balancing: low income −0.029 −0.028
[−0.098; 0.041] [−0.098; 0.041]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - no balancing: low income 0.024 0.024
[−0.043; 0.091] [−0.044; 0.091]
Widows PensionsRestriction: low income 0.003 0.004
[−0.070; 0.076] [−0.070; 0.077]
Widows PensionsAbolishment: low income −0.023 −0.023
[−0.089; 0.042] [−0.089; 0.043]
Retirement Age65 men&women: low income 0.019 0.019
[−0.053; 0.090] [−0.053; 0.090]
Retirement Age67 men&women: low income 0.007 0.007
[−0.075; 0.089] [−0.075; 0.089]
Early RetirementTargeted subsidies: low income 0.054 0.053
[−0.010; 0.118] [−0.011; 0.117]
Early RetirementSubsidies for all: low income 0.046 0.046
[−0.021; 0.113] [−0.021; 0.113]
Eligibility 2nd PillarExtend for low-income/part-time: low income 0.043 0.043
[−0.012; 0.098] [−0.012; 0.098]
VATincrease max. 1.5%: low income −0.011 −0.011
[−0.084; 0.062] [−0.084; 0.062]
VATincrease max. 3%: low income 0.009 0.009
[−0.065; 0.083] [−0.066; 0.083]
Ideology: left −0.001
[−0.011; 0.009]










Num. obs. 9640 9640
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Table 8: Models gender, control for ideology, age, income
Model 1 Model 2
Control variables
(Intercept) 0.666 0.662
[0.618; 0.714] [0.608; 0.717]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - balancing −0.077 −0.076
[−0.115; −0.039] [−0.115; −0.036]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - no balancing −0.119 −0.128
[−0.158; −0.080] [−0.169; −0.087]
Widows PensionsRestriction −0.025 −0.032
[−0.065; 0.015] [−0.075; 0.011]
Widows PensionsAbolishment −0.149 −0.151
[−0.188; −0.110] [−0.192; −0.109]
Retirement Age65 men&women 0.091 0.095
[0.056; 0.127] [0.057; 0.134]
Retirement Age67 men&women −0.085 −0.080
[−0.127; −0.043] [−0.125; −0.034]
Early RetirementTargeted subsidies 0.002 0.001
[−0.035; 0.040] [−0.038; 0.040]
Early RetirementSubsidies for all −0.013 −0.013
[−0.048; 0.023] [−0.051; 0.024]
Eligibility 2nd PillarExtend for low-income/part-time 0.019 0.026
[−0.009; 0.047] [−0.004; 0.057]
VATincrease max. 1.5% −0.008 0.002
[−0.047; 0.031] [−0.039; 0.044]
VATincrease max. 3% −0.136 −0.123
[−0.175; −0.097] [−0.165; −0.080]
Female −0.017 −0.008
[−0.087; 0.052] [−0.084; 0.068]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - balancing: female 0.046 0.049
[−0.005; 0.097] [−0.006; 0.105]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - no balancing: female 0.041 0.039
[−0.011; 0.093] [−0.016; 0.095]
Widows PensionsRestriction: female −0.053 −0.054
[−0.108; 0.002] [−0.114; 0.007]
Widows PensionsAbolishment: female −0.050 −0.052
[−0.102; 0.002] [−0.109; 0.005]
Retirement Age65 men&women: female −0.068 −0.066
[−0.119; −0.017] [−0.122; −0.010]
Retirement Age67 men&women: female −0.062 −0.065
[−0.120; −0.004] [−0.129; −0.001]
Early RetirementTargeted subsidies: female 0.027 0.026
[−0.024; 0.077] [−0.029; 0.081]
Early RetirementSubsidies for all: female 0.037 0.019
[−0.011; 0.085] [−0.033; 0.071]
Eligibility 2nd PillarExtend for low-income/part-time: female 0.043 0.040
[0.002; 0.083] [−0.003; 0.084]
VATincrease max. 1.5%: female 0.003 0.007
[−0.050; 0.056] [−0.051; 0.066]
VATincrease max. 3%: female 0.050 0.042
[−0.004; 0.104] [−0.017; 0.100]
Ideology: left −0.001
[−0.011; 0.008]










Num. obs. 11450 9640
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Table 9: Models party affiliation
Model 1 Model 2
Control variables
(Intercept) 0.582 0.557
[0.520; 0.644] [0.490; 0.624]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - balancing −0.046 −0.040
[−0.091; −0.002] [−0.088; 0.008]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - no balancing −0.053 −0.054
[−0.099; −0.006] [−0.104; −0.005]
Widows PensionsRestriction −0.026 −0.019
[−0.075; 0.023] [−0.074; 0.035]
Widows PensionsAbolishment −0.130 −0.125
[−0.177; −0.083] [−0.177; −0.073]
Retirement Age65 men&women 0.101 0.110
[0.056; 0.146] [0.062; 0.159]
Retirement Age67 men&women −0.003 0.013
[−0.054; 0.048] [−0.041; 0.067]
Early RetirementTargeted subsidies −0.019 −0.029
[−0.066; 0.029] [−0.082; 0.024]
Early RetirementSubsidies for all −0.037 −0.039
[−0.083; 0.008] [−0.089; 0.011]
Eligibility 2nd PillarExtend for low-income/part-time 0.015 0.021
[−0.018; 0.048] [−0.015; 0.057]
VATincrease max. 1.5% 0.015 0.033
[−0.038; 0.067] [−0.023; 0.088]
VATincrease max. 3% −0.065 −0.055
[−0.115; −0.015] [−0.111; −0.000]
ideolfarright 0.140 0.156
[0.041; 0.240] [0.047; 0.264]
ideolleft −0.024 −0.016
[−0.108; 0.060] [−0.106; 0.074]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - balancing:ideolfarright −0.016 −0.020
[−0.088; 0.056] [−0.097; 0.058]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - no balancing:ideolfarright −0.045 −0.050
[−0.118; 0.029] [−0.127; 0.028]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - balancing:ideolleft 0.002 −0.006
[−0.060; 0.064] [−0.072; 0.060]
Conversion Ratecutbacks - no balancing:ideolleft −0.064 −0.066
[−0.127; −0.001] [−0.132; 0.001]
Widows PensionsRestriction:ideolfarright −0.070 −0.078
[−0.151; 0.011] [−0.166; 0.010]
Widows PensionsAbolishment:ideolfarright −0.026 −0.029
[−0.103; 0.051] [−0.114; 0.055]
Widows PensionsRestriction:ideolleft 0.011 0.004
[−0.053; 0.076] [−0.066; 0.074]
Widows PensionsAbolishment:ideolleft −0.022 −0.028
[−0.086; 0.041] [−0.097; 0.041]
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Table 10: Models party affiliation,cont.
Model 1 Model 2
Control variables
Retirement Age65 men&women:ideolfarright −0.054 −0.046
[−0.128; 0.021] [−0.126; 0.034]
Retirement Age67 men&women:ideolfarright −0.084 −0.103
[−0.168; 0.000] [−0.195; −0.011]
Retirement Age65 men&women:ideolleft −0.037 −0.043
[−0.097; 0.022] [−0.106; 0.021]
Retirement Age67 men&women:ideolleft −0.132 −0.137
[−0.202; −0.063] [−0.210; −0.063]
Early RetirementTargeted subsidies:ideolfarright −0.016 −0.020
[−0.089; 0.057] [−0.100; 0.060]
Early RetirementSubsidies for all:ideolfarright 0.060 0.051
[−0.009; 0.128] [−0.022; 0.125]
Early RetirementTargeted subsidies:ideolleft 0.092 0.107
[0.031; 0.154] [0.040; 0.174]
Early RetirementSubsidies for all:ideolleft 0.046 0.052
[−0.015; 0.107] [−0.014; 0.117]
Eligibility 2nd PillarExtend for low-income/part-time:ideolfarright −0.022 −0.020
[−0.078; 0.034] [−0.081; 0.040]
Eligibility 2nd PillarExtend for low-income/part-time:ideolleft 0.072 0.072
[0.024; 0.120] [0.020; 0.123]
VATincrease max. 1.5%:ideolfarright −0.035 −0.037
[−0.118; 0.047] [−0.126; 0.051]
VATincrease max. 3%:ideolfarright −0.093 −0.099
[−0.171; −0.016] [−0.183; −0.014]
VATincrease max. 1.5%:ideolleft 0.037 0.024
[−0.029; 0.103] [−0.046; 0.094]
VATincrease max. 3%:ideolleft 0.025 0.027









Num. obs. 10870 9620
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E Robustness checks III: 2nd survey in 2016
E.1 Survey information
The survey was conducted in the French-, Italian- and German speaking parts of Switzerland between
April and August 2016 (after a pre-test in February 2016) and implemented by the survey company
LINK. It contains 1947 fully completed interviews. Sampling was done on the basis of the national
official register. Respondents were recruited via letter in which they were given a personalized login
for completing the survey. Respondents were – if needed – reminded three times (via letter twice and
a third time – if a phone number was available – via telephone). Our sampling strategy was based on
quota for the region, age and gender, drawn from the national census. Our overall response rate was 42%.
E.2 Specification of attributes and levels of the conjoint design,
2nd survey in 2016
Table 11: Reform elements that are being discussed (values) (2nd survey, 2016)
Reform elements Values Goal of the
(Attributes) reform elements
Pension cutbacks 1: status quo No cuts (6.8% conversion rate) Retrenchment
2nd pillar 2: government Cutbacks to 6%. Balance the lowering of pension
proposal levels by having people contribute more.
3: beyond gvt Cutbacks to 6% No balancing.
Cutbacks in 1: status quo All widows below 64 are eligible for benefits Retrenchment
widows’ pensions 2: government Only widows with children <16 years should be
proposal eligible
3: beyond gvt Stepwise abolishment of widows’ pensions
Increase in age of 1: status quo 64 for women, 65 for men Retrenchment
retirement 2: government Increase for women by 1 year: 65 for both
proposal
3: beyond gvt Stepwise increase for both men & women to 67
Increase in the level 1: status quo No increase in the level of basic pensions Compensation:
of basic pensions 2: government Increase by 70 CHF/month. In return: increase of targeting
proposal contribution-payments by 0.3 percentage points
3: beyond gvt Increase by 70 CHF/month
Extended elibility 1: status quo No change. Only people earning >24’000 CHF/year Compensation:
2nd pillar are eligible recalibration
2: government Extended access for part-time workers
proposal
3: beyond gvt Extended access for people with lower incomes
and part-time workers
Increased revenues 1: status quo No increase in VAT Compensation:
(VAT) 2: government Increase of VAT by max. 1 percentage points increased
proposal revenues
3: beyond gvt Increase of VAT by max. 2 percentage points
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E.3 Results conjoint analysis 2nd survey, 2016
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Figure 11: Effects of reform elements on support for the pension reform package, by
income
Medium/high income (N=927) Low income (N=394)
Difference:
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Figure 12: Effects of reform elements on support for the pension reform package, by
gender
Men (N=692) Women (N=741)
Difference:
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Figure 13: Effects of reform elements on support for the pension reform package, by party
Far right (N=378) Moderate right (N=479) Left (N=403)
Difference:
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F Robustness checks IV: Sophistication
To check whether the results differ between unsophisticated and sophisticated voters, we performed
several tests. Sophistication was measured by tertiary education (sophistication = 1) vs. no tertiary
education (sophistication = 0).
F.1 Split-sample test
Since the distribution of the sophistication variable is highly skewed (sophisticated = 622, unsophisticated
= 1244), we draw repeated random samples and compare the average of computed correlation measures.
More precisely, we use the following procedure:
Step A, unsophisticated voters:
1. Select random sample of 500 respondents
2. Select first split of packages (e.g. conjoint reform package comparisons 1-3)
3. Estimate AMCEs
4. Select second split of packages (e.g. conjoint reform package comparisons 4-5)
5. Estimate AMCEs
6. Calculate correlation between AMCE-estimates of split 1 and split 2 and save correlation
7. Repeat this procedure with 1000 random samples, each time saving correlation between AMCE
estimates
8. Calculate mean of 1000 correlation measures
Step B, sophisticated voters:
Repeat 1-8, calculate mean correlation.
Step C, compare correlation between AMCEs:
Table 12: Correlations between AMCEs, sophisticated and unsophisticated respondents
Splits Full Sophisticated Unsophisticated Sophisticated Unsophisticated
sample full sample full sample mean AMCE mean AMCE
N=622 N=1244 correlations of correlations of
1000 random samples 1000 random samples
of N=500 of N=500
(1,2) : (3,4,5) 0.96 0.89 0.96 0.87 0.89
(1,2,3) : (4,5) 0.95 0.82 0.97 0.80 0.91
(1,2) : (4,5) 0.94 0.85 0.96 0.83 0.88
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F.2 Coherence between conjoint and direct questions
A very broad array of questions in our survey allows for an alternative way to examine potentially varying
levels of comprehension among respondents. Beyond their choice of a reform package in the conjoint
experiment, respondents were also asked about their attitudes towards several of the reform components
in standard, uni-dimensional survey questions (Likert scale). For a total of three values belonging to
three different attributes in the conjoint setting, we have sufficiently similar direct questions asked later
in the survey (increase in retirement age, pension cutbacks second pillar, increase in VAT). We exploit
this duplication to compare average within-respondent coherence between the group of sophisticated and
unsophisticated respondents.
Step A: Individual attitudes in conjoint
Separate linear probability models are used to calculate respondent-specific estimates of the effect of the
three specific values of interest (increase in retirement age to 67, pension cutbacks second pillar without
compensation, increase in VAT by max. 3%) on choosing the displayed reform package or not. Given
the small sample size per respondent (N=10), this obviously results in imprecise estimates. However,
the point estimate nevertheless gives an indication regarding a respondent’s stance towards the specific
reform component. The resulting coefficients are subsequently classified into quartiles in order to a)
match the coding of the direct question and b) avoid over-interpretation of imprecise estimates.
Step B: Individual attitudes in direct questions
The answer category to the direct questions asking about the same reform components ranges from 1 to
4 and is recoded to match the direction of the equivalent items in the conjoint setting.
Step C: Compare level of within-respondent coherence between groups
Two different measures are used to compare coherence levels between the sophisticated and unsophis-
ticated group of respondents. First of all, Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient tests the
association between the paired sample. An asymptotic confidence interval is given based on Fisher’s Z
transform. As an alternative, Krippendorff’s alpha, a measure of coder reliability, is adapted to the pur-
pose of comparing coherence between groups. The main interest is in the difference between groups. The
absolute level of Krippendorff’s alpha in this application is not particularly informative as the measure
only evaluates whether ratings in both questions types (conjoint and direct) are identical (e.g. 4 and 4)
and does not reward similarity (e.g. 3 and 4 as opposed to 1 and 4). Bootstrapping (2000 iterations)
provides confidence intervals for the given probabilities.
The following table presents mean values and confidence intervals of both measures of comparison
resulting from 1000 repeated random samples of each group (N=500) to avoid differences in the measures
based on unequal group size.
Table 13: Coherence between conjoint and direct questions
Sample Estimate 95% CI
Pearson’s r
full 0.463 0.422 - 0.502
sophisticated 0.482 0.442 - 0.520
unsophisticated 0.450 0.409 - 0.490
Krippendorff’s alpha
full 0.174 0.238 - 0.110
sophisticated 0.195 0.260 - 0.130
unsophisticated 0.161 0.226 - 0.097
Irrespective of the trusted indicator, as one would expect, coherence is slightly higher among re-
spondents with tertiary education but the measures of coherence do not differ in statistically significant
terms.
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